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Code-Based Cryptosystems Using Generalized
Concatenated Codes
Sven Puchinger, Sven Mu¨elich, Karim Ishak, Martin Bossert
Abstract The security of public-key cryptosystems is mostly based on number the-
oretic problems like factorization and the discrete logarithm. There exists an algo-
rithm which solves these problems in polynomial time using a quantum computer.
Hence, these cryptosystems will be broken as soon as quantum computers emerge.
Code-based cryptography is an alternative which resists quantum computers since
its security is based on an NP-complete problem, namely decoding of random linear
codes. The McEliece cryptosystem is the most prominent scheme to realize code-
based cryptography. Many codeclasses were proposed for the McEliece cryptosys-
tem, but most of them are broken by now. Sendrier suggested to use ordinary con-
catenated codes, however, he also presented an attack on such codes. This work
investigates generalized concatenated codes to be used in the McEliece cryptosys-
tem. We examine the application of Sendrier’s attack on generalized concatenated
codes and present alternative methods for both partly finding the code structure and
recovering the plaintext from a cryptogram. Further, we discuss modifications of the
cryptosystem making it resistant against these attacks.
1 Introduction
Public-key cryptography was introduced in 1976 by [DH76]. The advantage in com-
parison to classical cryptosystems is, that sender and receiver do not have to share
a common secret key, since two different keys are used for encryption and decryp-
tion. The receiver (Bob) publishes a public key, which is used by the sender (Alice)
to encrypt messages she wants to send to Bob. When Bob receives an encrypted
message, he uses his private key for decryption. Nowadays, the security of public-
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key cryptosystems is usually based on number theoretic problems, like factorization
of large numbers (RSA [RSA78]) or the discrete logarithm (Elgamal [ElG85]). For
solving these two problems there are no efficient algorithms known so far. However,
Shor’s algorithm solves these problems in polynomial time on quantum computers
[Sho94]. As soon as quantum computers will exist in the future, the aforementioned
cryptosystems are broken and will become useless. Hence, there is a need for so-
called post-quantum cryptography, i.e., new methods which resist the quantum com-
puter. One candidate for this purpose is code-based cryptography.
The first code-based cryptosystem was proposed by McEliece only two years
after the emerge of public-key cryptography. The security of this system is based
on the NP-complete problem of decoding random linear codes [BMVT78]. Using
the McEliece cryptosystem, encryption and decryption can be performed very ef-
ficiently. The main problem is the large size of the public key. For this reason,
code-based cryptography was forgotten for a long time and now becomes interest-
ing again due to quantum computer resistance. Initially, McEliece suggested to use
binary Goppa codes in his cryptosystem. Later, other code classes were suggested.
However, in most cases it was also shown that there are attacks which break them.
This work investigates generalized concatenated codes for use in the McEliece cryp-
tosystem.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the McEliece
cryptosystem and present a general attack on the system. Section 3 explains neces-
sary fundamentals. In Section 4 we present both, ordinary and generalized concate-
nated codes. Furthermore, we discuss the use of generalized concatenated codes in
Section 5 and give a classification of generalized concatenated codes that connot
be described as ordinary concatenated codes. Section 6 is about Sendrier’s attack,
which recovers the structure of an ordinary concatenated code used in the McEliece
cryptosystem. We examine under which conditions the attack can be modified in
order to work also with generalized concatenated codes. In Section 7 we give alter-
natives for parts of Sendrier’s attack in order to apply it on GC codes. Also, an attack
which recovers the plaintext from a cryptogram instead of finding the structure of
the underlying code is explained. Section 8 presents methods which can be used in
order to prevent the attacks explained before. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 McEliece Cryptosystem
The McEliece cryptosystem, introduced in [McE78], is the first public-key cryp-
tosystem based on algebraic coding theory. For generating private and public key,
Bob first selects an error-correcting code of length n and dimension k which can
correct up to t errors. He then computes a (k× n) generator matrix G for this code.
Furthermore, he randomly produces two matrices, S, which is a (k× k) invertible
matrix and P, which is a (n× n) permutation matrix. These matrices are used in or-
der to obfuscate G and hence to hide the structure of the code. Therefor he calculates
˜G= S ·P and publishes the pair ( ˜G, t) as public key. The code as well as the matrices
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G, S and P he keeps secret as private key. In order to send a message to Bob, Alice
makes use of Bob’s public key to encrypt her message. She breaks her message into
k-bit blocks and multiplies each of these blocks to the obfuscated generator matrix
˜G. To each of the blocks, she then adds a random vector e of length n and weight
≤ t, which can be interpreted as error. Hence, the calculation r = m · ˜G+ e can di-
rectly be compared to the mapping of information blocks to codewords in a typical
channel coding scenario. In order to decrypt the received message r, Bob needs the
matrices P and S and a decoding algorithm for the used code. He calculates
rˆ = r ·P−1 = (m · ˜G+ e) ·P−1
= (mS ·G ·P+ e) ·P−1
= m ·S ·G ·P ·P−1 + e ·P−1
= m ·S ·G+ e ·P−1.
In analogy to channel coding, rˆ has the form of a received word consisting of the
information word m ·S and the error e ·P−1. Bob uses the decoding algorithm on rˆ
to obtain mˆ = m ·S. Finally he can multiply mˆ with S−1 to retrieve m.
In order to be used in the McEliece cryptosystem, a code class needs to fulfill
two requirements. An efficient decoding algorithm has to exist for the used code
class, and the code has to be indistinguishable from a random code. In the original
proposal, binary Goppa codes were used. For suitable parameters they are unbroken
until today, since they fulfill both requirements. Other code classes were suggested
(cmp. Table 1).
Table 1 Proposed code classes for the McEliece cryptosystem and suggested attacks
Code class Proposal Attacks
Generalized Reed-Solomon codes 1986: Niederreiter 1992: Sidelnikov, Shestakov
Ordinary concatenated codes 1995: Sendrier 1998: Sendrier
Reed-Muller codes 1994: Sidelnikov 2007: Minder, Shokrollahi
2013: Chizhov, Borodin
Algebraic geometry codes 1996: Janwa, Moreno 2008: Faure, Minder
2014: Couvreur, Ma´rquez-Corbella,
Pellikaan
Subcodes of GRS codes 2005: Berger, Loidreau 2010: Wieschebrink
In contrast to the more complex operations in number-theoretic methods like
RSA, encryption and decryption in the McEliece scheme can be performed faster
and are easy to implement. Since the security is based on the NP-complete prob-
lem of decoding random linear codes, the McEliece cryptosystem is a candidate for
post-quantum cryptography. The system’s main drawback is a large key size be-
cause generator matrices are used as keys. For this reason the cryptosystem was not
applicable for a long time.
Another code-based cryptosystem similar to McEliece is the Niederreiter cryp-
tosystem introduced in [Nie86]. In contrast to the McEliece cryptosystem, which
uses a codeword with an added error as ciphertext, the Niederreiter cryptosystem
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represents the ciphertext as a syndrome and the error vector is the message. In-
stead of a generator matrix, Niederreiter uses a parity check matrix as public key,
and hence is also called a dual version of McEliece. It was shown in [LDW94],
that the cryptosystems of McEliece and Niederreiter are equivalent when set up for
corresponding choices of parameters. This means, that an attack on McEliece cryp-
tosystem also breaks the Niederreiter cryptosystem and vice versa.
There are two kinds of possible attacks to the McEliece cryptosystem. In a struc-
tural attack, the adversary tries to retrieve the code structure and hence to recover
S′,G′,P′, and an efficient decoder of the code generated by G′, such that S′ ·G′ ·P′.
Structural attacks were for example successfully applied to (subcodes of) general-
ized Reed-Solomon codes, Reed-Muller codes, Algebraic geometry codes and ordi-
nary concatenated codes. A non-structural attack tries to recover the message from
the cryptogram r and the public-key ( ˜G, t). This is equivalent to the problem of
decoding random linear codes.
Information Set Decoding Attack
In the following, we give an example for a message attack called information set
decoding, as described in [McE78, LB88], of which we present an efficient modifi-
cation for concatenated codes in Section 7.2.
Given a code with parameters (n,k,d) and generator matrix ˜G. In order to recover
m in r=m · ˜G+e we randomly choose δ coordinates of r and ˜G. With rδ we denote
the vector we get by only taking the δ chosen coordinates from the vector r. Simi-
larly, ˜Gδ denotes the matrix obtained from ˜G by extracting the δ chosen columns.
Restricting our vectors to the δ chosen coordinates we obtain rδ = m · ˜Gδ + eδ . If
we are lucky and choose δ error-free coordinates, eδ is the zero-vector. Thus, the
system of linear equations rδ = m · ˜Gδ , with known ˜Gδ , rδ and unknown m, has a
solution, which is unique as long as ˜Gδ has rank k.
Obviously, we must choose δ ≥ k. For MDS codes, we know that any set of k
columns of ˜G is linearly independent [MS77]. Other codes do not have this prop-
erty, however, to our knowledge, this has been an open problem for many years.
We conjecture that for most practically good codes, a linearly independent set of
columns is obtained with high probability already for values of δ slightly larger
than k.
Algorithm 1: Information Set Decoding Attack
Input: ˜G and r = m · ˜G+ e with wtH(e) = t
Output: m
1 do
2 Choose δ many coordinates at random // O(1)
3 Solve rδ = mˆ · ˜Gδ for mˆ // O(k3)
4 while ∄mˆ or dH(mˆ · ˜G,r)≥ d2
5 return mˆ
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Theorem 1. If t < d2 , the algorithm is correct. Its expected complexity is(
n
δ
)(
n−t
δ
) ·O(δ 3).
Proof: From coding theory we know that if t < d2 , there is a unique mˆ such
that the Hamming distance of mˆ · ˜G and r is dH(mˆ · ˜G,r) ≥ d2 . This mˆ is also the
unique solution of r− e = mˆ · ˜G. If δ is chosen large enough, a random submatrix
˜Gδ of rank k with error-free positions is found in a step with a non-zero probability,
and thus, by the lemma of Borel–Cantelli, the algorithm terminates in finite time
with probability 1.
Concerning the complexity, we assume that δ is chosen sufficiently large such
that the probability that a submatrix ˜Gδ has rank < k can be neglected. Thus, the
number of loops required to terminate the algorithm is geometrically distributed
with parameter
p =
(
n−t
δ
)(
n
δ
) ,
which is exactly the probability of choosing δ out of n− t correct positions in Line 2
of Algorithm 1. Thus, the expected number of loops required is 1p and together with
the complexity of Line 3, which is O(δ ), we obtain the expected complexity(
n
δ
)(
n−t
δ
) ·O(δ 3).
We can thus conclude that in case of practical codes, where δ ≈ k, we obtain an
upper bound on the work factor1 of(
n
k
)(
n−t
k
) ·O(k3),
where t = ⌊ d−12 ⌋. According to [Hey13] the parameters have to be chosen such
that a work factor of 2128 (for mid-term security) or 2256 (for long-term security) is
obtained. There are several speed-ups [CG90, Pet10, BJMM12], and generalizations
[LB88] of the information set decoding attack.
1 Estimation of the complexity up to a constant factor which is not depending on the parameters of
the system.
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3 Fundamentals
In this section, we present notations and known results which we do not assume all
readers to know.
3.1 Notation
Let V,W be Fq-vector spaces. A mapping ϕ : V → W is called Fq-linear if
ϕ(a1v1 + a2v2) = a1ϕ(v2)+ a2ϕ(v2)
for all a1,a2 ∈ Fq and v1,v2 ∈V . The Hamming weight wtH(c) of c ∈ Fnq is defined
as the number of non-zero positions of c. The Hamming distance of c1,c2 ∈ Fnq is
dH(c1,c2) := wtH(c1− c2). An Fq-linear code C (qm;n,k,d) of length n, dimension
k and minimum distance d = min
c1 6=c2
{dH(c1,c2)} over Fqm is a k-dimensional Fq-
subspace of Fnqm .
3.2 Vector and Matrix Representation of Extension Fields
Every finite field Fqm is an Fq-vector space of dimension m. Thus, there is a basis
B = {β1, . . . ,βm}⊆ Fqm in which every element a∈ Fqm has a unique representation
a = ∑mi=1 aiβi with ai ∈ Fq. Define the vector space isomorphism
extB : Fqm → Fmq ,a 7→ a = [a1, . . . ,am].
We call extB(a) the vector representation of a with respect to the basis B. It is well-
known that the set {extB(·) : B basis of Fqm over Fq} is equal to all vector space
isomorphisms (= Fq-linear maps) Fqm → Fmq . This implies, e.g., that for any b∈ Fqm
and b ∈ Fmq , there is a basis B such that extB(b) = b.
Lemma 1. Some facts about vector and matrix representation of finite extensions of
finite fields Fqm/Fq:
(i) Every finite field Fqm is isomorphic to a subfield Mqm of the matrix ring Fm×mq .
We write mr(a)∈Mqm to denote the matrix representation of an element a∈Fqm .
(ii) Every column or row of a matrix representation of Fqm can be used to uniquely
represent elements of Fqm . We denote the vector representation of an element
a ∈ Fqm , given by this column or row, by vr(a) ∈ Fmq . vr(·) = extB(·) for some
basis B.
(iii) If a specific column or row as in (ii) is chosen, the set of representative vectors
of all elements in Fqm is equal to Fmq .
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(iv) If a specific row as in (ii) is chosen, the multiplication of two elements a,b ∈
Fqm corresponds to vr(a ·b) = vr(a) ·mr(b).
(v) If a specific column as in (ii) is chosen, the multiplication of two elements
a,b ∈ Fqm corresponds to vr(a ·b) = mr(a) ·vr(b).
(vi) For a specific row or column as in (ii) and an arbitrary basis B of Fqm over
Fq, Mqm can be chosen such that the vector representation of a ∈ Fqm is extB(a).
Proof:
(i) This statement is well-known and can e.g. be found in [LN97] or [War94].
(ii) Since the operations multiplication, addition and inversion in Fqm correspond
to the same operations of matrices in Mqm , all matrices except for the zero matrix
in Mqm are invertible. Now choose an arbitrary row (column) index i. We show
that the rows (columns) of matrices in Mqm of this index are distinct. Choose
two matrices M1,M2 ∈Mqm . Assume that their i-th rows (columns) are the same.
Then the i-th row (column) of M1−M2 ∈Mqm is the zero vector. Thus, M1−M2
is not invertible and must be the zero matrix, implying that M1 = M2.
Let φ(a) be the operation of extracting a specific row (column) from a ∈Mqm .
Since
φ(mr(α ·a+β ·b)) = φ(α ·mr(a)+β ·mr(b))
= α ·φ(mr(a))+β ·φ(mr(b))
for all α,β ∈ Fq and a,b ∈ Fqm , φ(mr(·)) is a vector space isomorphism and is
therefore equal to extB(·) for some basis B.
(iii) This follows from a simple counting argument. Due to (ii), a specific row
(column) represents all elements from Mqm , thus also from Fqm , uniquely. Hence,
|{mr(a) : a ∈ Fqm}|= |Fqm |= qm = |Fmq |. Since {mr(a) : a ∈ Fqm} ⊆ Fmq ,
{mr(a) : a ∈ Fqm}= Fmq .
(iv) It is clear by mr(a ·b) = mr(a) ·mr(b) and by looking at the operations nec-
essary to calculate the i-th column (= vr(a · b)) of the result on the right-hand
side.
(v) Analog statement as in (iv).
(vi) The statement is clear since we can simply change the basis of the matrix
representation, e.g., by setting mrnew(a) = B ·mr(a) ·B−1 for all a ∈ Fqm .
3.3 Coding Theory Basics
We will need the following lemma in Section 6.1. More precisely, we require the
slightly weaker statement that for any linear code C with dual distance d⊥, for
any r < d⊥ positions, we can find a codeword in C in which we can choose the r
positions arbitrarily.
8 Sven Puchinger, Sven Mu¨elich, Karim Ishak, Martin Bossert
Lemma 2. [MS77] Any set of r ≤ d⊥− 1 columns of [C ] contains each r-tuple ex-
actly 2k2r times, and d
⊥ is the largest number with this property, where [C ] is a 2k×n
array of codewords of the code C (n,k,d).
4 Concatenated Codes
We distinguish between ordinary concatenated codes (OC codes or OCC) intro-
duced by [For66]), and generalized concatenated codes (GC codes or GCC) intro-
duced by [BZ74]. Concatenated codes can be used to construct long codes by only
using short codes. The main advantage of such a construction is a comparatively
short decoding time, since we only have to decode short codes.
4.1 Ordinary Concatenated Codes
We describe OC codes as in [Sen95, Sen98]. The following codes and mappings
uniquely determine an OC code.
• Linear inner code B(q;nB,kB,dB).
• Linear outer code A (qkB ;nA,kA,dA).
• Fq-linear map θ : FqkB → A .
We define the mapping
Θ : FnA
qkB
→ BnA
 a1..
.
anA

 7→

 θ (a1)..
.
θ (anA)

 .
Then, the corresponding OC code is given as
COC =Θ(A )⊆BnA
and due to its construction, it is Fq-linear since A is FqkB -linear, implying Fq-
linearity, and θ is Fq-linear. The code has (qkB)kA = qkB·kA codewords, each of it
consisting of nA many codewords from B, resulting in a codelength of nA · nB ele-
ments of Fq. Thus, the code has parameters
COC(q;nOC = nA ·nB,kOC = kB · kA,dOC),
where dOC is the minimum distance, whose value we do not consider here.
Code-Based Cryptosystems Using Generalized Concatenated Codes 9
4.2 Generalized Concatenated Codes
GC codes are a generalization of OC codes, introduced by [BZ74]. Here, we give
a definition which is similar to the above mentioned definition of OC codes by
[Sen95], which was not given in this form before. A comprehensive overview of
GC codes can be found in [Bos99] and we explain in Appendix 10.1 why our defi-
nition matches [Bos99]. Similar to OC codes, we require the following parameters,
codes and mappings.
• k1,k2, . . . ,kℓ ∈ N with kB = ∑ℓi=1 ki.
• Fqki -linear outer codes A (i)(qki ;nA,k
(i)
A ,d
(i)
A ) for i = 1, . . . , ℓ
• Fq-linear inner code B(q;nB,kB,dB).
• Fq-linear map θ : ⊕ℓi=1Fqki → B.
Again, we define a mapping
Θ :
ℓ⊕
i=1
(Fqki )
nA → BnA




a1,1
a1,2
.
.
.
a1,nA

 ,


a2,1
a2,2
.
.
.
a2,nA

 , . . . ,


aℓ,1
aℓ,2
.
.
.
aℓ,nA



 7→


θ (a1,1, . . . ,aℓ,1)
θ (a1,2, . . . ,aℓ,2)
.
.
.
θ (a1,nA , . . . ,aℓ,nA)

 .
The corresponding GC code is given by
CGC =Θ
(
ℓ⊕
i=1
A
(i)
)
⊆BnA
with parameters CGC(q;nGC = nA · nB,kGC =
ℓ
∑
i=1
k(i)A ,dGC), see Appendix 10.1. In
our definition, CGC ⊆BnA , which is often written as an nA×nB matrix over Fq. We
can also write it as an nA ·nB vector over Fq and the information words from the set⊕ℓ
i=1Fqki as vectors of dimension kGC = ∑ℓi=1 k
(i)
A over Fq, which we need in order
to define a generator matrix G of the code. The advantage of GC compared to OC
codes is that we allow several outer codes with different dimensions and are hence
able to obtain better codes, cf. Appendix 10.1.
5 The McEliece Cryptosystem using GCC
The motivation to use concatenated codes in the McEliece cryptosystem has the big
advantage of very low decoding complexity, which is retained when going from OC
to GC codes. OC codes have the drawback of possibly larger key sizes at the same
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security level compared to codes without concatenated structure. This disadvantage
is not present in the GCC case since its construction admits larger overall dimen-
sion at the same minimum distance, or a better decoding performance at the same
dimension compared to OC codes.
Assumption that θ is linear
In the McEliece cryptosystem, only the use of linear codes is reasonable because the
existence of a generator matrix is required. In the original definition of GC codes,
it was not assumed that the mapping θ is Fq-linear. However, θ :
⊕ℓ
i=1Fqki → B
must be bijective and thus, its image is a linear subspace of FnBq .
One can now ask the question whether a GC code with a non-linear θ can be a
linear code. And if yes, is there an alternative GCC construction using a linear θ ′
and possibly different other outer codes, yielding the same code. Both questions are
open problems. If the first one is true and the second one is not, these codes might
resist the attacks presented in this paper.
However, since most good GC code constructions having low decoding com-
plexity, which motivated the use of GC codes here, use an Fq-linear θ (cf. Ap-
pendix 10.1), we make the assumption that θ is linear.
A classification of GC codes that are no OC codes
In general, it is well-known that GC codes are a generalization of OC codes [Bos99].
Obviously, any OCC is a GCC, given by only one outer code. On the other hand,
it is mentioned in [CS93] that any GCC can be viewed as an OCC. However, in
general, one must admit non-linear inner and outer codes in the definiton of OCC
to make this statement become true. Since there is a known structural attack on
OCC [Sen95, Sen98], we would like to know which GCC cannot be constructed as
OCC. We are not able to give a complete classification of the set of GC codes not
containing OC codes. However, we are able to prove the following statement for the
special case of
k1 = k2 = · · ·= kℓ,
which is a very important sub-class of GC codes, cf. Appendix 10.1.
Theorem 2. If k1 = k2 = · · ·= kℓ, a GCC is an OCC ⇔ A (i) = A ( j) ∀i, j.
Proof: “⇒”: Let CGC = Θ(⊕ℓi=1 A (i)), with θ Fq-linear, be a GC code. As-
sume that CGC is an OCC. Then, there are an Fq-linear θ ′ and an FqkB -linear code
A such that Θ ′(A ) =Θ
(⊕ℓ
i=1 A
(i)
)
and thus,
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A =Θ ′−1
(
Θ
(
ℓ⊕
i=1
A
(i)
))
.
Hence, Θ ′−1
(
Θ
(⊕ℓ
i=1 A
(i)
))
must be an FqkB -linear code. The mapping Θ ′−1(Θ(·)) :⊕ℓ
i=1F
nA
qki
→ FnA
qkB
is component-wise Fq-linear, i.e., there is an Fq-linear mapping
˜θ : ⊕ℓi=1Fqki → FqkB such that
Θ ′−1 (Θ (a1,a2, . . . ,aℓ)) :=Θ ′−1

Θ




a1,1
a1,2
.
.
.
a1,nA

 ,


a2,1
a2,2
.
.
.
a2,nA

 , . . . ,


aℓ,1
aℓ,2
.
.
.
aℓ,nA






=


˜θ (a1,1, . . . ,aℓ,1)
˜θ (a1,2, . . . ,aℓ,2)
.
.
.
˜θ (aℓ,nA, . . . ,aℓ,nA)

=:


a˜1
a˜2
.
.
.
a˜nA

 ∈ FnAqkB
for all ai ∈ Fqki . Due to kB = ∑ℓi=1 ki = ∑ℓi=1 k1 = ℓ · k1, ki = k1|kB and FqkB can be
seen as an extension field of Fqk1 with extension degree [FqkB : Fqk1 ] = ℓ.

a1
a2
.
.
.
aℓ

=


a1,1 a1,2 . . . a1,nA
a2,1 a2,2 . . . a2,nA
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
aℓ,1 aℓ,2 . . . aℓ,nA

= extB ([a˜1 a˜2 . . . a˜nA]) .
Choosing the corresponding matrix representation of α ∈ FqkB over Fqk1 as in
Lemma 1, we can write
extB
(
α · [a˜1 a˜2 . . . a˜nA])= mr(α) · extB ([a˜1 a˜2 . . . a˜nA])= mr(α) ·


a1
a2
.
.
.
aℓ


Since ai ∈ A (i),
[
a˜1 a˜2 . . . a˜nA
] ∈ A also α · [a˜1 a˜2 . . . a˜nA] must be in A for all
α ∈ FqkB and thus, extB
(
α · [a˜1 a˜2 . . . a˜nA])∈⊕ℓi=1 A (i). Due to Lemma 1, we can
choose α such that the i-th row of mr(α) is can be an arbitrary
[
α1 α2 . . . αℓ
]∈ Fℓ
qki
and thus, the i-th row of extB
(
α · [a˜1 a˜2 . . . a˜nA]) is ∑ℓj=1 αiai. This implies that
A ( j) ⊆A (i) for all j, i = 1, . . . , ℓ and thus all outer codes A (i) are the same.
“⇐” : If A ( j) = A (i) for all i, j, we can choose any basis B of FqkB over Fqki .
Since multiplying elements of ext−1B (
⊕ℓ
i=1 A
(i)) by FqkB scalars corresponds to a
left multiplication by a matrix in MqkB , and any Fqki
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of different A (i)’s again is contained in any A (i), the set A := ext−1B (
⊕ℓ
i=1 A
(i)) is
an FqkB -linear code. The Fq-linear map is given by θ ◦ extB.
Theorem 2 provides an exact statement which GC codes can be constructed as
OC codes. In particular, it shows that only for very few choices of the outer codes
A (i), we obtain an OC code. E.g., it follows directly that the dimensions of the outer
codes must all be the same, which would correspond to rather suboptimal GC codes
(cf. Appendix 10.1).
Hence, we see that the set of linear GC codes has a much larger cardinality than
the set of linear OC codes. Note, that Theorem 2 can be used to practically estimate
the number of linear GC codes which Alice can choose from, namely by counting
the possible choices of outer codes A (i).
It is an open problem to prove a similar statement as in Theorem 2 for the general
case where the ki’s are not all the same.
6 Applying Sendrier’s Attack
Sendrier’s attack [Sen95, Sen98] was proposed to find the structure of a concate-
nated code from a given obfuscated generator matrix. In this section, we deal with
the question how we have to modify the attack to work also with GC codes. We
generally divide Sendrier’s attack into three steps, where the first two try to revert
the permutations done to the generator matrix up to a certain level, and the third step
attempts to find possible generator matrices of the inner and outer codes.
6.1 First Step
The first step aims to find the inner blocks of a GC code, which are the positions
corresponding to the same set B in c∈CGC ⊆BnA . In order to describe a procedure
accomplishing the task, we need to give some definitions.
Definition 1. The following definitions are necessary [Sen98, Definition 9-11]
• The support of a vector c is given as supp(c) = {i : ci 6= 0}.
• The support of a set is the union of the supports of its elements.
• A codeword c ∈ C is called minimal support codeword if there is no other code-
word c′ ∈ C with supp(c′)⊆ supp(c).
• The set of all minimal support codewords in C is called P(C )
• Two vectors c,c′ are called connected if their supports intersect.
• Positions i, j are connected in a set S∈C if there is a sequence words c1, . . . ,cr ∈
S such that
– i ∈ supp(c1) and j ∈ supp(cr)
– ck and ck+1 are connected ∀ k = 1, . . . ,r− 1.
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• A set S ∈ C connects a set of positions I if any two elements in I are connected
in S.
As in [Sen98], we can formally define an inner block as
Definition 2. The i-th inner block of a GCC is the support supp({Θ(a · ei) : a ∈
FqkB}), where ei is the i-th unit vector.
Let now CGC be a given GCC. Similar to the statement of [Sen98, Proposi-
tion 16], we can prove the following.
Theorem 3. The support of every c∈P(C ⊥GC) with wtH(c)<min(d(1)A
⊥
, . . . ,d(ℓ)A
⊥
,2 ·
dB⊥) is contained in a single inner block of CGC.
Proof: Let c∈P(C⊥GC) with wtH(c)<min(d(1)A
⊥
, . . . ,d(ℓ)A
⊥
,2 ·dB⊥). Then the
support of c is contained in r ≤ wtH(c) inner blocks. We want to show that r < 2.
Since wtH(c) < d(i)A
⊥
, the positions of A (i) corresponding to these inner blocks
can be chosen arbitrarily fromFr
qki
due to Lemma 2. Thus, the positions of
⊕ℓ
i=1 A
(i)
corresponding to these inner blocks can be chosen arbitrarily from
⊕ℓ
i=1F
r
qki
.
Due to θ (⊕ℓi=1Fqki ) = B, CGC contains codewords that have any element of Br
in the r inner blocks. Any element of C ⊥GC with support contained in these r inner
blocks must have codewords of B⊥ in all its inner blocks because for any of the r
inner blocks j, one can construct a codeword that has an arbitrary element of B in
inner block j and the zero codewords in the other r− 1 blocks. Hence, r < 2 due to
wtH(c)< 2 ·dB⊥ and the pigeonhole principle.
The following statement is taken from [Sen98].
Lemma 3. [Sen98, Proposition 15] Let C be a linear code. P(C ) connects supp(C )
iff C is not the direct sum of two disjoint support codes.
Using Theorem 3 and Lemma 3, we can prove the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If B is not the direct sum of two disjoint support codewords, the set
of elements of P(C⊥GC) with weight < min(d(1)A
⊥
, . . . ,d(ℓ)A
⊥
,2 ·dB⊥) connects each
inner block of CGC.
Proof: Due to Theorem 3, every minimal support vector c ∈ P(C⊥GC) with
weight < min(d(1)A
⊥
, . . . ,d(ℓ)A
⊥
,2 ·dB⊥) is contained in a single inner block. This im-
ples, that c, restricted to this inner block, is in a minimal support vector of P(B⊥).
Since B is not the direct sum of two disjoint support codes, by Lemma 3, P(B)
connects supp(B), which corresponds to the entire inner block. Hence, if we find
enough c ∈ P(C⊥GC) with weight < min(d(1)A
⊥
, . . . ,d(ℓ)A
⊥
,2 · dB⊥), we obtain the
supports of all inner blocks.
Corollary 1 gives us the tools for finding the supports of the inner blocks of
CGC. We simply exploit [Sen98, Propositions 13 and 14] to find as many mini-
mal support codewords as necessary to identify the inner blocks, as described in
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[Sen98]. However, the sufficient condition that this method works is a bit more strict
compared to the OC case since we can only use minimal support words of weight
< min(d(1)A
⊥
, . . . ,d(ℓ)A
⊥
,2 ·dB⊥).
If the method works, we obtain the supports of the inner blocks from which we
can construct a permutation matrix PStep 1 which re-orders the columns of ˜G such
that columns corresponding to the same inner bock are grouped together, i.e., form
a kGC× nB submatrix of ˜G ·PStep 1.
6.2 Second Step
Codewords of CGC are elements of BnA , exactly as codewords of OC codes. In
Section 6.1, we saw how to identify the inner blocks of the code, i.e. the positions
that correspond to the same B in BnA . However, in order to identify the structure of
the code, we also need to know the permutations between the inner blocks, i.e., we
want to re-order the positions such that we obtain a codeword in [σ(B)]nA , where
σ(B) = {σ(c) := (cσ(1),cσ(2), . . . ,cσ(n) : c ∈B}.
This part of Sendrier’s attack only depends on properties of the inner code B. To
be exact, Sendrier uses the i-th signature of a code B [Sen98], which is the weight
distribution of B punctured at position i, to identify the permutations between two
codes B and B′. Thus, it is directly applicable to GC codes.
Using this method, it is possible to extract the relative permutations of the differ-
ent inner blocks and to reorder them to be in the same order as one specific block,
which is permuted from the original code B by some permutation σ . It is mentioned
in [Sen95] that this part of the attack only works if the automorphism group of B is
reduced to the identity element, which, if this condition is not fulfilled would yield
a bad overall code.
Figure 1 illustrates how the first two steps of Sendrier’s attack recover the
structure of the permutation matrix P used in the obfuscated generator matrix
˜G = S ·G ·P. Here, PStep 1 and PStep 2 denote the matrices that we obtain by Steps 1
and 2 respectively and which we can multiply to ˜G from the right to structure the
inner blocks. The Pi, j’s are nB×nB submatrices of a permutation matrix and the Pi’s
are nB× nB permutation matrices. P1 is the permutation matrix that transforms B
into σ(B).
˜G = S ·G·

P1,1 P1,2 P1,3 · · · P1,nA
P2,1 P2,2 P2,3 · · · P2,nA
P3,1 P3,2 P3,3 · · · P3,nA
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
PnA,1 PnA,2 PnA,3 · · · PnA,nA


Step 1−→
˜G ·PStep 1 = S ·G·

0 P2 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 · · · PnA
P1 0 0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 P3 · · · 0


˜G ·PStep 1 ·PStep 2 = S ·G·
Step 2−→


0 P1 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 · · · P1
P1 0 0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 P1 · · · 0


Fig. 1 Illustration of permutation recovery in Steps 1 and 2 of Sendrier’s attack.
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Note, that after applying Step 2, the effective permutation matrix ˜G · PStep 1 ·
PStep 2 is still in a form in which inner blocks are permuted among each other and
within the inner blocks, positions are permuted. However, the first kind of permuta-
tion simply corresponds to a permutation of the outer codes (all the same) and the
latter is a permutation of the inner code.
Thus, we recovered the permutations such that ˜G ·PStep 1 ·PStep 2 is a generator
matrix of a GC code with outer codes equivalent to the original outer codes (equiva-
lent by the same permutation τ) and with the inner code (or equivalently, the image
of θ ) being permuted by σ .
6.3 Third Step
The subsequent steps are applied after obtaining the permutation matrices PStep 1
and PStep 2 of the first two steps of Sendrier’s attack. This step, we subdivide into
two Substeps 3.1 and 3.2.
Step 3.1
By transforming the matrix ˜G ·PStep 1 ·PStep 2 into reduced row echelon form, the
first kB × nB submatrix is a generator matrix of a permuted version σ(B) of the
code B. This part of Sendrier’s attack is directly applicable to GC codes since the
first kB× nB submatrix of the reduced row echelon form of ˜G ·PStep 1 ·PStep 2 is a
basis of the row space V of ˜G ·PStep 1 ·PStep 2, restricted to the first nB columns. This
subspace equals the span of all codewords restricted to an inner block j, permuted
by a permutation σ , and thus the image of
σ
(
θ
({[
a j,1 . . .a j,ℓ
]
: a j,i is j-th position of ai ∈A (i)
}))
.
Due to Theorem 2, it holds that
{[
a j,1 . . .a j,ℓ
]
: a j,i is j-th position of ai ∈A (i)
}
=
ℓ⊕
i=1
Fqki
and we obtain
V = σ
(
θ
(
ℓ⊕
i=1
Fqki
))
= σ (B) .
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Step 3.2
The remaining part of the third step of Sendrier’s attack on OC codes is responsible
for obtaining the structure of the outer code up to a permutation and a Frobenius field
automorphism applied component-wise [Sen98]. This method works because the
generator matrix of obtained by row-reducing ˜G ·PStep 1 ·PStep 2 is highly structured
in the OC case.
However, it remains an open problem whether similar arguments can be used
to find ways of utilizing the structure of this matrix in the GC case. Due to time
restrictions, we were not able to translate the arguments used by Sendrier to GC
codes.
7 Alternatives to Parts of Sendrier’s Attack
In Section 6, we saw that parts of Sendrier’s structural attack on OC codes can be
applied to GCC directly. However, it remains an open problem to recover a complete
structure of the code. Also, the steps of the attacks are not always guaranteed to
work, cf. sufficient conditions in each step. Thus, we are interested in replacing as
many parts of Sendrier’s attack as possible by an alternative.
7.1 Sendrier’s Second and First Part of Third Step
Assume that Step 1 of Sendrier’s attack was successful and we obtained the permu-
tation matrix PStep1 such that the code generated by the matrix ˜G ·PStep1 is a subset
of
nA⊕
i=1
σi(B),
i.e., we know which positions correspond to the same inner block, although the
blocks are in a different order than in the original code and also within the blocks,
positions are permuted arbitrarily (by a permutation σi). Thus, we also know which
positions of r correspond to the same inner blocks (by computing r ·PStep1).
We can find generator matrices Gσi(B) of all codes given by the positions of the
i-th inner block by the following method, which is similar to Sendrier’s Step 3.1,
cf. Section 6.3, but more general: Restrict ˜G to the columns corresponding to the
i-th inner block and just extract a linearly independent subset vectors in the row
span, e.g. by Gaussian elimination in O(nB3) time. This method works because the
positions of the outer codes corresponding to the j-th inner block attain all values
of
⊕ℓ
i=1Fqki , cf. Lemma 2 with k
(i)
A < nA for all i, and thus, the span of the rows of
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˜G restricted to the j-th inner block are equal to θ (⊕ℓi=1Fqki ) = B, with positions
permuted by the permutation σi.
The advantage of this approach is that the second step of Sendrier’s attack is not
required. Also, we can replace σi(B) by and code Bi and the method will still work.
This fact is important in Section 8.
7.2 Non-Structural Attack
Let r = m ˜G+ e. In this section, we present an attack that does not find a structure
of the code, but is able to recover the message m from the received word r if not too
many errors wtH(e) occurred. Such attacks are called non-structural. The method
works for both OC and GC codes.
We need to know the positions of the inner blocks, which we e.g. obtain by Step 1
of Sendrier’s attack. Thus, we also know which positions of r correspond to the same
inner blocks (by compuing r ·PStep 1). The number of errors is not changed by this
operation since wtH(e ·PStep 1) = wtH(e). Also, we require that either Step 3.1 of
Sendrier’s attack or our alternative presented in Section 7.1 worked. This means
that we know generator matrices Gσi(B) of the codes in the inner blocks i.
We can divide our non-structural attack into two parts:
7.2.1 Part 1
The goal of this part is to decode the positions of r that correspond to the i-th inner
block of CGC in the code σi(B). In general, there are several possible methods to
decode in σi(B), e.g.,
• If we know a structural attack on the McEliece cryptosystem using the inner code
B, we can use this attack in combination with the known generator matrix Gσi(B)
of σi(B) to obtain an efficient decoder of the code σi(B) for any i. Since B has
much smaller length than the entire code CGC (in most cases, nB ∈Θ(√nGC)),
such structural attacks have much smaller work factors than direct attacks on a
code of length nGC.
• We can apply the information set decoder described in Section 2 on the generator
matrix Gσi(B) and the corresponding part of r. Due to Theorem 1, the attack
finds the correct part of the codeword c = r− e if the number of errors in this
block does not exceed half the minimum distance of the inner code. Otherwise,
the decoding result is wrong (another codeword is found) or decoding fails (e.g.
after some finite time without result, one aborts the algorithm).
18 Sven Puchinger, Sven Mu¨elich, Karim Ishak, Martin Bossert
In both cases, we can2 obtain decoders that find a codeword c˜i from a received
word ri = ci + ei if and only if wtH(ri − c˜i) < dB2 , where ci ∈ σi(B) is the part
of c ·PStep 1 corresponding to the i-th inner block. This type of decoder is called
bounded minimum distance decoder, cf. [Bos99].
If ci = c˜i, we say that decoding is correct. If ci 6= c˜i decoding is wrong and if the
decoder does not have a result, decoding failed. Suppose that nc inner blocks were
correctly and nw were wrongly decoded, and in nf inner blocks, decoding failed.
7.2.2 Part 2
The second part of our non-structural attack can be seen as a speed-up of the infor-
mation set decoding attack (cf. Section 2) utilizing the results of Part 1. As in infor-
mation set decoding, we are looking for δ error-free positions of r, where δ ≥ kGC.
We make use of the fact that inner blocks which were decoded correctly in Part 1
do not contain errors. Thus, instead of finding δ single error-free positions in r, we
simply try to find τ ≥ δ
nB
inner blocks that were correctly decoded in Part 1 and thus
obtain τ ·nB ≥ δ error-free positions. Also, we can ignore blocks in which decoding
failed. These tricks reduce the overall complexity of the attack significantly. The
method is illustrated in Figure 2. Here, the received word, which is an element of
(FnBq )nA , is seen as an nA× nB matrix over Fq, where each inner block corresponds
to a row of the matrix.
r = c+ e =
×
× ×
×× × ×
.
.
.
×
× × ×
××
Decode
inner blocks
using Part 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
Extract inner
blocks that
did not fail
.
.
.
.
.
.
Randomly choose τ
out of these nc +nw
inner blocks. Goal:
Find τ correct ones.
Legend: × Single error in some inner block.
Correctly decoded inner block (nc many)
Wrongly decoded inner block (nw many)
Inner block in which decoding failed (nf many)
Fig. 2 Illustration of non-structural attack.
2 If the obtained algorithms are better, i.e., can correct more than half the minimum distance of
errors, we can simply declare a decoding failure if the distance of codeword to received word is
greater than half the minimum distance.
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We denote by rτ , eτ and ˜Gτ the parts of r, e and ˜G restricted to the columns
corresponding to the τ chosen inner blocks. If we find τ of the nc correctly decoded
blocks, the system
rτ = mˆ · ˜Gτ + eτ︸︷︷︸
=0
= mˆ · ˜Gτ
has a solution mˆ. If τ is chosen large enough, ˜Gτ has full rank kOC, the solution mˆ is
unique and fulfills dH(mˆ · ˜G,r)< dGC2 . For most practical codes, we conjecture that
it is not necessary to choose τ much larger than δ
nB
≈ kB
nB
.
The entire non-structural attack is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Non-Structural Attack
Input: r = m · ˜G+ e with wtH(e) = t, PStep 1 and Gσi(B) for all i = 1, . . . ,nA.
Output: m
1 Decode inner blocks of r as described in Part 1, using PStep 1 and Gσi(B).
2 do
3 Choose τ out of nA− nf inner blocks, in which decoding did not fail.
4 Solve rτ = mˆ · ˜Gτ for mˆ.
5 while ∄mˆ or dH(mˆ · ˜G,r)≥ dGC2
6 return mˆ
Theorem 4. If t < dGC2 , Algorithm 2 is correct with high probability.
Proof: Line 1 corresponds to Part 1 of the non-structural attack. Its correctness
follows from the arguments in Section 7.2.1. Due to t < dGC2 , τ ≤ nA− nf with high
probability. Thus, Line 3 finds τ correct blocks with non-zero probability in any
loop and hence, it must find them in finite time with probability 1. When τ correct
blocks are found and τ is chosen large enough, the system rτ = mˆ · ˜Gτ has a unique
solution, again with high probability. By coding theoretic arguments, it holds that
m = mˆ and c = mˆ · ˜G. Thus, dH(mˆ · ˜G,r) = wtH(e) = t < dGC2 and the algorithm
terminates.
7.2.3 Complexity of the Non-Structural Attack
In general, the work factor of the non-structural attack is the sum of the work factors
of the two parts:
W =W1 +W2
Assume that in the first part, the decoding was done using the information set
decoding attack. Thus, we have to apply nA many small attacks, each of work factor
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kB3 ·
(
nB
kB
)(
n−tB
kB
) ,
where tB = ⌊ dB−12 ⌋ is half the minimum distance of B. Thus,
W1 = nA ·
kB3 ·
(
nB
kB
)(
n−tB
kB
)
In the second part, the probability of choosing a subset of τ correctly decoded
inner blocks is
p =
(
nc
τ
)(
nc+nw
τ
) .
Solving the system of linear equations can be done in kGC3 operations, yielding an
expected work factor of
W2 =
kGC3
p
= kGC3 ·
(
nc+nw
τ
)(
nc
τ
) .
In Appendix 10.2, it is shown that for the parameters proposed for an OC code
construction by [Sen95], we obtain a work factor of
W ≈ 229.7,
which is considered to be insecure [Hey13]. We conclude that we have found a non-
structural attack whose work factor is significantly reduced compared to a naive
structural attack on CGC directly. Thus, parameters of a GCC or OCC construction
must be chosen much larger than non-concatenated codes in order to compensate the
security level. This increases the size of the public key considerably and probably
implies that GC codes are not practically relevant to the McEliece cryptosystem,
which already struggles with the disadvantage of large key sizes.
8 Methods of Preventing Attacks
In the previous sections, we saw that Sendrier’s attack for OC codes is partially
applicable to GC codes. Also, we were able to give a non-structural attack which is
efficient for practical GC codes. In this section, we present methods for preventing
parts of these attacks.
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8.1 Preventing the Second Step of Sendrier’s Attack
Sendrier’s second step tries to synchronize the permutations of the inner blocks. As
already mentioned in Section 6.2, this method only works if the permutation group
of the code B is reduced to the identity element. Thus, one possibility would be to
choose B with a non-trivial permutation group. However, it is already mentioned
in [Sen98] that such codes yield bad OC codes, implying that also GC codes would
not be good.
Another possibility would be to change the definition of OC or GC codes such
that we use different codes in each inner block. This corresponds to having several
mappings
θi :
ℓ⊕
i=1
→Bi
with i = 1, . . . ,nA and Bi(q;nB,kBi,dBi) pairwise distinct, such that
Θ :
ℓ⊕
i=1
(Fqki )
nA →
nA⊕
i=1
Bi



a1,1
a1,2
.
.
.
a1,nA

 ,


a2,1
a2,2
.
.
.
a2,nA

 , . . . ,


aℓ,1
aℓ,2
.
.
.
aℓ,nA



 7→


θ1(a1,1, . . . ,aℓ,1)
θ2(a1,2, . . . ,aℓ,2)
.
.
.
θnA(a1,nA , . . . ,aℓ,nA)


in the definition of OC or GC codes. This construction is similar to the one used
to define Justesen codes [Jus72], which are certain OC codes with different inner
codes. If the codes Bi have pairwise different j-th signatures (cf. Section 6.2) for
all j = 1, . . . ,nB, Step 2 of Sendrier’s attack does not work for either modified OC
or modified GC codes. However, it can easily be seen that the alternative method
described in Section 7.1 still works for different inner codes and thus, also the non-
structural attack can be applied in this case.
8.2 Preventing the First Step of Sendrier’s Attack
Any attack described in this paper relies on the success of the first step of Sendrier’s
attack. Therefore, it is an important question whether we can find a large sub-class
of GC codes which are resistant against this part of the attack.
The necessary condition for this method to work is that the inner code B is not
the union of two disjoint support codewords. Sendrier [Sen98] already mentioned
that codes violating this condition are rather bad code. Also, if e.g. the inner code
was exactly the union of r disjoint support codes which cannot be further splitted,
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the attack would give us r ·nA connected disjoint subsets of the code positions. We
thus need to try the subsequent parts of the attack for all combinations of r subsets
grouped to an inner block each. For small r and nA, the number of possibilities might
still be small enough to not increase the overall work factor much.
As proven in Section 6.1, a sufficient condition that Sendrier’s attack works is
that the set
Ξ := {c ∈P(C⊥GC) : wtH(c)< min(d(1)A
⊥
, . . . ,d(ℓ)A
⊥
,2 ·dB⊥)}
is not empty. Every c ∈ Ξ is in C⊥GC and thus, wtH(c) ≥ dGC⊥ ≥ dB⊥. Therefore, it
follows that
Ξ 6= /0 ⇒ dB⊥ < min(d(1)A
⊥
, . . . ,d(ℓ)A
⊥
,2 ·dB⊥).
Hence, if any of the outer codes A (i) has dual distance d(i)A
⊥ ≤ dB⊥, Ξ = /0 and
Sendrier’s first step is not guaranteed to work. It needs to be mentioned that Ξ 6= /0
is a sufficient condition and someone might find a modification of the first step that
can handle the case Ξ = /0. This problem needs further investigation.
In the OC case, if dA⊥ is decreased, the dimension kA is also decreased and thus,
the OC code might become bad. The advantage of GC codes is that only one of
the outer codes needs to have this property and we can still obtain a good GC code
satisfying Ξ = /0. This fact makes us believe that there is the possibility of a large
subclass of practically relevant GC codes that resist the first step of Sendrier’s attack.
9 Conclusion
In this work we studied the suitability of generalized concatenated codes in the
McEliece cryptosystem, motivated by the advantage of faster decoding than codes
without concatenated structure. First, we gave a partial classification of GC codes
that cannot be described as OC codes, for which a complete structural attack is
known [Sen98]. We analyzed Sendrier’s structural attack on OC codes for applica-
bility in the GC case. Step 1 of this attack can be directly applied, however with a
stricter sufficient condition. Steps 2 and 3.1 were proven to work in exactly the same
cases as for OC codes. However, it remains an open problem whether Step 3.2 of
Sendrier’s attack can be modified to work with GC codes.
We further gave an alternative method of obtaining the result of Step 3.1, only
requiring the output of Step 1 of Sendrier’s attack. In contrast to Step 2, this method
works for all outer codes and can be performed in polynomial time. We were able
to improve the complexity of the information set decoding attack significantly, us-
ing the result of Step 1. This gives us a non-structural attack which we showed to be
efficient for code parameters similar to the original McEliece Goppa codes construc-
tion. Hence, we can conclude that if Sendrier’s first step works, this non-structural
method forces code parameters to be chosen so large that key sizes become im-
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practical compared to other code constructions. Figure 3 summarizes the attacks
discussed in the paper.
Sendrier
Step 1♣,♥
Step 2♠
Step 3.1
Step 3.2♦
Alternative
Find Gσi(B)
Non-Structural
Part 1
Part 2
A B: B needs result of A.
A B: B can alternatively use the result of A.
♣ Sufficient condition: dB < min(d(1)A
⊥
, . . . ,d(ℓ)A
⊥
,2 ·dB⊥)
♥ Necessary condition: B is not a direct sum of two disjoint support codes
♠ Works only if the permutation group of B is reduced to the identity element.
♦ So far: Only works for OCC. Open problem if also applicable to GCC.
Fig. 3 Summary of Attacks.
We proposed several methods which have the potential to prevent parts of
Sendrier’s attack, especially Step 1, and which only work in the GC case. This fact
shows that GC codes, in contrast to OC codes, are still candidates for the use in the
McEliece cryptosystem. It needs to be studied whether the methods of preventing
Sendrier’s first step cannot be circumvented by any efficient method. Other open
problems are finding a necessary condition for Sendrier’s first step to work. Also,
Step 3.2 requires further studies in order to give a complete structural attack on GC
codes.
10 Appendix
10.1 GCC Construction and Decoding
Generalized concatenated (GC) codes were introduced by [BZ74]. This section
presents construction and decoding of GC codes according to [Bos99, Chapter 9].
Code concatenation is used in order to obtain long codes with low decoding com-
plexity. The advantage of a GC code in comparison to an OC code with same length
and dimension is, that the GC code can correct more errors. A GC code consists of
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one inner and several outer codes of different dimensions. If we only use one outer
code, we obtain an OC code.
The idea of generalized code concatenation is to partition the inner code into
several levels of subcodes. We generate a partition tree as follows. The inner code
becomes the root of the tree. We partition the inner code into subcodes which form
the second level of the tree. We again partition each of the subcodes and continue un-
til we end up at a level in which each subcode consists of only one codeword. These
subcodes become the leaves of the tree. Let B( j)i
(
q;nB,kB( j)i ,dB
( j)
i
)
denote the inner
codes at level j. The partitioning should be done such that the minimum distance
of the subcodes increases strictly monotonically from level to level in the parti-
tion tree. Each codeword can be uniquely identified by enumerating the branches of
the partition tree and following this enumeration from the root to the correspond-
ing leaf. The numeration from level j to level j + 1 is protected by an outer code
A ( j)
(
qk j ;nA,k( j)A ,d
( j)
A
)
. This encoding scheme matches the definition of GC codes
in Section 4.2 by simply taking θ as the function that maps the enumeration of a
codeword from the root to a leaf to the codeword of B which is contained in this
leaf. Note, that for many linear codes B, there is a partitioning which corresponds
to an Fq-linear mapping θ , cf. [Bos99]. Also, most practically good GC codes ful-
fill k1 = k2 = · · · = kℓ = 1 due to the existence of many linear subcodes of B (e.g.
Reed–Muller codes), which helps constructing many partitioning. An example of
the encoding and transmission process is visualized in [Bos99, Figure 9.10].
To obtain a good GC code, the dimensions of the outer codes have to be differ-
ent. Also, the minimum distances of the outer codes should decrease from level to
level. Keeping the product d( j)A ·dB( j)i for all i, j roughly constant also leads to good
properties. The latter follows from a decoding procedure that reduces the problem
of decoding GC codes to a sequence of ℓ decoders of OC codes with minimum
distances d( j)A · dB( j)i j for some sequence of i j’s for all j = 1, . . . , ℓ. We refer to the
example presented in [Bos99, Figure 9.11]. The length of the constructed GC code
is nGC = nA ·nB, the dimension is k = ∑ℓi=1 k(i)A , and the minimum distance is lower
bounded by dGC ≥mini, j
(
d( j)A ·dB( j)i
)
.
10.2 Work Factor of Non-Structual Attack on Code Ex. in [Sen95]
In [Sen95], Sendrier uses an OC code of parameters (2048,308,≥ 425). The in-
ner code is a random code B(16,7,5) over F2 and the outer code is a GRS code
A (128,44,85) over F27 . A simulation was performed using Matlab on 1500 ran-
dom codes (B(16,7,5)) by adding errors with a probability of 2122048 to each code-
word of B and then decoding it. 1000000 codewords for each code were used. The
estimations for the probabilities of correct decoding, wrong decoding and failure in
decoding are pc = 0.7741, pw = 0.0441 and pf = 0.1818, respectively. The corre-
sponding standard deviation values are 0.00042,0.0043 and 0.0043. The expected
number of correctly and wrongly decoded, and failed inner blocks are then given by
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nc = nA · pc = 128 ·0.7741≈ 99,
nw = nA · pw = 128 ·0.0441≈ 6,
nf = nA · pf = 128 ·0.1818≈ 23.
By choosing m = kA = 44 inner blocks, we obtain the work factor
W2 =
3083
p
≈ 308
3
0.0345 ≈ 8.4686 ·10
8 ≈ 229.7.
With
W1 = 128 ·
73 · (167 )(16−⌊ 5−12 ⌋
7
) ≈ 1.4635 ·105,
W1 ≪W2, and the overall work factor is then equal to
W ≈ 229.7.
This work factor is considered to be insecure, cf. [Hey13].
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